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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM BACKGROUND  
Ammunition distribution for the United States Navy involves receiving a 
requisition from an end user and then shipping that required item to the customer. The 
current system is a “pull-based” method, which means that it is dependent upon the 
customer initiating the resupply process. Munitions distribution costs the Navy 
approximately $30M per year in total costs with nearly $9M of that being expedited 
shipments. 
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this MBA Project is to investigate and provide a comprehensive 
assessment for standardizing the ammunition distribution system used by the United 
States Navy. This project was conducted with the sponsorship and assistance of the Naval 
Supply Systems Command – Global Logistics Support. The goal of this project was to 
identify and document the current system used for ammunition distribution, discuss both 
the push and pull methods of supply chain distribution, and then recommend one of these 
methods, or possibly a hybrid of the two, to Naval Supply Systems Command for 
potential implementation based on data analysis. Analysis was performed on requisition 
information from Naval Munitions Commands to end users (those ordering particular 
types of ammunition) in an effort to determine which potential method would have the 
greatest economic impact for cost savings. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Little research has been conducted in the specific topic of ammunition distribution 
for any of the armed forces, so our efforts focused on reviewing the system currently in 
use and then comparing it to industry best practices. From this study and the creation of a 
Monte Carlo Simulation based on the last seven years’ worth of requisition data, we 
determined a possible new approach for distribution that has the potential for 
considerable dollar savings for the Navy. Recognizing that each Service has different 
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requirements for support and readiness, this proposed distribution system may not be 
compatible with the other services or DoD agencies. 
We organized this project as follows:  Chapter II is a discussion of what the Push 
and Pull Methodologies are and a literature review of what has been discussed 
previously. Chapter III provides background on each of the eight major Naval Munitions 
Commands and Chapter IV discusses the current ammunition distribution system used by 
the Navy as well as industry best practices for supply chain distribution models. We 
conducted data analysis and discuss Monte Carlo Simulation in Chapter V. Additionally, 
we provide our recommendations for future action by the Navy with regard to changing 
the ammunition distribution system in Chapter V. Finally, we conclude with 
recommendations for future studies in Chapter VI. 
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II. SUPPLY CHAIN DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
A. PUSH METHODOLOGY 
In the following two sections, we discuss how supply chain strategies are 
categorized as either a Push- or Pull-based strategy. Each strategy is unique, with 
individual characteristics along with advantages and disadvantages. We explain in detail 
each one of these strategies. 
The Push-based system of distribution has been in existence and documented as 
being used in production and manufacturing since the beginning of the twentieth century 
(although it was not always called “push”), coinciding with the manufacturing revolution 
that occurred during this same time period. In this system, manufacturers produce and 
distribute their products based on historical retailer orders data. With this historical data, 
a manufacturer/supplier is able to create a demand forecast, allowing them to make 
production quantity decisions (Skjott-Larsen, Schary & Mikkola, 2007). Under the Push 
system, “production is dominated by large consumer goods manufacturers. The 
manufacturers have long production runs in order to gain efficiencies of scale and 
minimize unit costs” (Bonacich & Wilson, 2008). Under this system, manufacturers often 
entice retailers with promotions and discounts in order to attain large advanced purchases 
pushing products out to the retailers’ warehouses.   
As with any type of supply chain strategy, there are always advantages and 
disadvantages of this production and distribution system. One advantage of using a push-
based system is the idea of “product certainty.”  Manufacturers know with little doubt 
that the demand for their product will be consistent, so they can continue to have long 
production runs. Certain commonly used and mass-production items (see Figure 1) such 
as diapers, office supplies, basic construction materials, soap or detergent, pasta, etc., will 
yield success within a push system because they will always have a constant demand. 
This illustration shows this point by showing that these products “are characterized by 
predictable demand and slow product introduction frequency,” which are suited best by 
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utilizing a push-based strategy, yielding supply chain efficiency and high inventory turns 
(Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky & Simchi-Levi, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Supply Chain Strategies (From Simchi-Levi et al., 2008) 
Another advantage and reason for manufacturers to use a push-based strategy is to 
have long production runs of a product, which ultimately lowers the per-unit cost of each 
item for the manufacturer. They are able to save money with their production costs 
because they are manufacturing more products per production run vice having to set up 
their production line to run that product more often creating economies of scale. Through 
these economies of scale, the company is able to achieve a larger item capacity, therefore 
they are able to offer their product to consumers at a lower price. Also, with long 
production runs, the chances of running out of a product are lowered because the 
manufacturer has produced enough for the retailer to last until the next scheduled 
production run.   
Due to production and distribution being based on demand forecasts, it takes 
longer for a push-based supply chain system to react to the changing market place, which 
can lead to overreaction and the bullwhip effect. The manufacturer maintains a consistent 
production schedule and unless there is communication with the retailer about the current 
demand for a product, the product could be overproduced if demand drops. This potential 
for overproduction would then lead to a lower number of inventory turns and high 
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average on-hand inventory, as well as increased inventory costs.   In many common 
production scenarios, there is almost no communication between the retailer and 
manufacturer regarding customer demand, so the “lack of visibility on the manufacturer” 
will ultimately lead to excess inventory because the manufacturers base their production 
runs and distribution on demand forecast as opposed to actual sales (Viale, 1996). 
Another disadvantage with push-based strategy is tied to the actual demand forecast 
never being completely accurate, which can lead to either “lost sales, obsolete inventory, 
and inefficient utilization of resources” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2008). 
During particular seasons, like Christmas, there is little to no flexibility to 
accommodate “a sudden surge in consumer demand for a hit product.” An example of 
this occurred in 1996 with the “Tickle Me Elmo” doll. The manufacturer, Tyco Toys, had 
no idea that its product would be in such high demand and did not have the 
manufacturing capacity to complete a quick production run in order to meet the 
unexpected surge, losing all potential sales. Because customer demand was 
underestimated for this toy, Tyco Toys manufacturers were caught with a demand level in 
excess of what they could support. 
If the supplier obtains demand information directly from its customers, and if the 
customers allow the supplier to control the shipments, this push-based system is called a 
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). VMI has advantages in potential inventory reduction 
because of just in time distribution from the supplier to the retailers. These benefits are 
typically counted by a requirement for a high level of trust to exist between the supplier 
and retailer for this type of system to work. As will be discussed later in this project, the 
element of trust is necessary for a VMI distribution system to operate efficiently. 
To summarize, a push-based strategy is good for the manufacturer if they are able 
to produce large amounts of a single product, spreading the setup costs against a large 
number of units. This will ultimately lower the individual costs to manufacture that item. 
This strategy is also good for items that have a predictable demand because the 
manufacturer can continue to produce this item knowing that the demand will not falter. 
The disadvantage of a push-based system is its reliance on forecasts used to determine 
production levels. There is no guarantee that the forecast will always be accurate; thereby 
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creating the risk that there will not be enough of the product to meet demand or that there 
will be too much product raising inventory holding costs. 
B. PULL METHODOLOGY 
The “Pull” inventory management system, sometimes called Just-In-Time (JIT), 
began as one facet of Toyota’s “lean” production methodology. The background idea of 
lean manufacturing was to create the desired product with as little waste as possible, with 
the definition of waste being anything that the customer did not want. If done properly, 
“lean” can provide immense gains “by eliminating non-value-adding activities, reducing 
lead times and faster flow through the factory by driving manufacturing through customer 
demand (pull) and continuous improvements” (Patni Computer Systems, 2005). This pull 
management system has now been incorporated into many manufacturing processes by a 
number of suppliers due to its direct impact on total costs through the reduction of 
operational expenses. 
The pull inventory management system performs as follows. When any item is 
sold by a retailer, that retailer places an order to replace that single item only. That single 
item, which would be the finished product handled by the supplier, is shipped to the 
retailer. The supplier now has a gap in its finished product inventory, so that supplier will 
now “pull” another finished product from upstream to replace what was shipped. If no 
finished product exists, an upstream workstation may have to complete the manufacturing 
process. Regardless of the number of workstations involved in this total process, only one 
order moves at a time with each station pulling from the next upstream workstation. 
Eventually, the “last” upstream station is reached—that of bringing raw materials into the 
factory to begin the work-in-process labor. In practice, the pull system may involve larger 
orders (instead of a single unit) constituting what is called a Kanban:  the standard lot size 
calculated for that particular item managed by the pull system. 
Boundaries, or clear separation points, can be created between push and pull 
methodologies where one method might be more profitable than the other. Performance 
measures such as customer wait time and service goals will allow the manufacturer to 
choose the correct support and distribution method. When determining this boundary 
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between push and pull (see Figure 2), “the decoupling point separating the part of the 
supply chain operating in a make-to-order environment [pull] from the part of the supply 
chain based on planning [push]” must be ascertained (Croxton, Garcia-Dastugue, 
Lambert, & Rogers, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 2.   Push-Pull Boundaries (From Simchi-Levi et al., 2008) 
The Kanban system (see Figure 3) is an example of the pull methodology in 
action. Also developed by Toyota, the Kanban system incorporates a visual trigger to 
signal demand. While the word “kanban” means “sign” or “instruction card,” there are 
also other paperless methods for controlling product movement. One example is the use 
of containers or bins—if the bin is empty, it means that the worker at that station has used 
up all available resources and must be resupplied in order to continue working. This 
empty bin is then filled by the next upstream worker from his own bin of ready for 
transfer parts. Other production lines might use colored golf balls to signify a requirement 
of a certain type of part needed in the manufacturing process. The key difference between 
the pull and push systems of inventory management can be seen with this example—
while a worker may have material that is ready to be used by the next person downstream 
in the manufacturing process, that material is not sent “down-the-line” until it is 
requested. Thus, the downstream worker pulls material from upstream rather than having 




quantity for each process is determined on the basis of the consumed quantity at the 




Figure 3.   Kanban System (After Jacobs, Chase, & Aquilano, 2009) 
The greatest benefit of the pull methodology is the reduction in operational 
expenses because of the elimination of waste. Since orders are placed only upon a sale, 
another benefit is a reduction of working capital required for operations because work-in-
process inventory only needs to be as large as the next order (no stockpiling is required). 
Capital requirements are also reduced due to the fact that large amounts of cash are not 
typically tied up in held inventory—the retailer has an initial start-up cost to fill his or her 
shelves but, after that, only orders what is actually selling. The pull method also allows 
for a retailer to take action only if demand changes, preventing the retailer from suffering 
from the bullwhip effect (Arts, 2004). 
Some of the risks of shifting to a pull method for inventory management include 
higher ordering costs, transportation costs, and strains on the supplier-retailer relationship 
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because of more frequent orders. Due to the reduced order size when using the pull 
method (as opposed to the push methodology which orders up to a desired on-hand 
inventory number) and assuming that there is a fixed cost of placing an order, the 
ordering costs will rise in correlation to the increased number of orders. This ordering 
cost should be fairly stable after fully conversion to the pull system, which will then 
make holding costs an overriding factor for implementation decisions. Since pulling 
inventory reduces the on-hand inventory requirement, the holding costs should also be 
reduced and the pull system should become “more cost-effective at a wider range as the 
demand level increases” (Abuhilal, Rabadi, & Sousa-Pouza, 2006). 
Similar to ordering costs, the transportation costs that a business incurs when 
shifting to a pull inventory management system are likely to increase. These cost 
increases are due to the more frequent but smaller-sized deliveries that have to occur to 
ensure that a factory can remain a just-in-time producer. The increase in transportation 
costs may, however, be offset by the reduction in on-hand inventory requirements, so the 
total operating costs may actually fall (Aron, 1998). Additionally, if a retailer is able to 
receive split vendor shipments, where merchandise originating from many companies is 
loaded onto the same truck for delivery, costs may be reduced by receipt of a single truck 
rather than numerous partially filled ones. 
Finally, the relationship between a supplier and a retailer can become strained 
when implementing a pull management system.  “With a pull contract the manufacturer/ 
supplier bears the inventory risk because only the supplier holds inventory while the 
retailer replenishes as needed during the season” (Pearson, 2008). Many of these retailers 
are risk averse and carry only the inventory that is found on the shelves of their stores, so 
they have to be willing to directly communicate with their suppliers and often even share 
real-time data. Retailers that have incorporated the pull inventory management system 
often have some of the best information and technology infrastructure as well as supply 
chain management concepts in order to achieve this symbiotic working relationship with 
their suppliers (Wong, Arlbjorn, & Johansen, 2005). 
As can be seen from the above discussion, there are many varying opinions on 
which method is best for production and distribution. While most academics and 
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practitioners tend to favor the pull methodology, this is not always the correct option for 
every circumstance. The pull system is excellent in many various environments, but it 
can also be disastrous in other operations. The main issue is that the pull system cannot 
react quickly to sudden increases in demand while the push system protects against these 
surges in demand by having an increased on-hand inventory at all times. This balance 
between on-hand inventory and protection level is what will be discussed in this project. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we discuss the literature on Supply Chain Management and Push 
and Pull Methodologies as used within private business strategies that can be applied to 
the Naval Ammunition Distribution System. 
Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, and Simchi-Levi (2008) discuss how the supply chain in 
any industry is the group of suppliers, producers, transporters, distributors and end 
customers, and supply chain management (SCM) is the process of managing the 
relationships between each of these groups whom often have different goals and metrics 
for performance. They specifically defined SCM as “a set of approaches utilized to 
efficiently integrate suppliers, manufacturers, warehouses, and stores, so that 
merchandise is produced and distributed at the right quantities, to the right locations, and 
at the right time, in order to minimize system-wide costs while satisfying service level 
requirements.” 
Sahay and Mohan (2003) address how inventory replenishment is conducted 
using a push-based system and how the long-term forecasting models used by this system 
can affect retailer’s warehouses. Specifically, because of flaws in the forecasting model, a 
retailer might have a glut of inventory that customers are not willing to buy or a shortage 
of items that are in high demand. They briefly discuss the pull inventory process and its 
respective influence on inventory management. This influence is based expressly on the 
movement of a product from the store’s shelves due to customer demand. Production in 
the pull system is thus demand driven in an effort to only replace what was removed and 
not what is forecasted to move in the future. 
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Takahashi and Nakamura (2004) indicate that, within the SCM framework, there 
are three methods of control—those of push, pull, or a hybrid mix of the two. Their 
writings reflect that the amount of inventory flowing through a system is the key factor 
when determining which method of distribution is best suited for use. When the push 
system is used, a company will typically have a larger amount of work in process within 
their production and distribution systems and conversely, a pull system will have less 
work in process inventory held at a particular location but will require more frequent 
shipments between locations or workstations. Finally, a hybrid version can be created that 
may be able to balance the areas in production that require higher levels of inventory 
(push-based) with those that require less (pull-based). 
Aron (1998) reported on how industries shift from push to pull methods in SCM 
by analyzing what she deemed the “old” (push) and “new” (pull) ways of doing business. 
Her article lists many of the costs of shifting from push to pull, which can be applied to 
any industry or supply chain, whether it is a private company or in the public domain 
such as the DoD. Examples of these costs include increased transportation costs due to an 
increase frequency of shipments and ordering costs if there is a set price for placing an 
order. In turn, these costs may be offset by the reduced amount of inventory required to 
be held on-hand by the pull system. 
Croxton, Garcia-Dastugue, Lambert, and Rogers (2001) enter the discussion on 
SCM by defining what they deem the eight core SCM processes and how each core 
element must be implemented at both operational and strategic levels if a fully effective 
supply chain is to be built. Examples of these core SCM processes include “customer 
relationship management, demand management, order fulfillment, and manufacturing 
flow management.”  They stress that the level of flexibility desired by the customer 
within each of these processes will ultimately determine the push-pull boundary for 
stocking points. One of the key additions of these authors’ writings is that they identify 
where the Push-Pull Boundary in production and distribution may exist. It is this 
boundary point where the possibility of creating a hybrid system of push and pull might 
alleviate strains associated within each of these systems. 
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Pearson (2008) reviews how push and pull strategies are incorporated into 
manufacturing, and how each strategy places the inventory risk on different places of the 
overall supply chain. When using the push strategy, the manufacturing process is driven 
by customer due dates and the stocking levels of the retailer. Risk must be accounted for 
due to the forecasting nature of the push system because orders are placed prior to the 
selling season, so if customer choice changes, the retail store is left with unsellable 
merchandise. With the pull strategy, it is the manufacturer that bears risk because they 
might not be able to meet customer demand in a timely fashion and would thus lose sales 
to a competitor. Thus, the pull system can be more appropriate when the demand is 
predictable or when the supplier has sufficient capacity to supply during times of peak 
demand. Additionally, Pearson elaborates on how customer demand and the distribution 
strategies will influence each other—something of particular interest in both public and 
private industry. 
Agarwala (2005), who wrote for Patni Computer Systems Limited, discusses 
Supply Chain Optimization, which is a subset of SCM seeking to optimize every step by 
identifying and working with “value chain members” within the total supply chain. 
Agarwala specifically shows how lean manufacturing, one step in the pull strategy, can 
not only eliminate non-value added activities within the supply chain, but also lead to the 
adoption of a pull distribution system. She illustrates how software applications can 
support lean techniques, such as using a pull-based scheduling system of delivery to 
minimize inventories and work-in-process. 
Wong, Arlbjorn, and Johansen (2005) reviewed the supply chain of a private 
industry in Europe where volatility of customer demand and the seasonality directly 
impact how retailers stock their shelves. They specifically discuss the toy industry and 
how seasons and holidays associated with those times of year directly affect new product 
lines (new products are introduced around Christmas holidays). Additional strains on this 
supply chain exist because of the storage and disposal costs associated with an inventory 
that can quickly become obsolete. They discuss how point-of-sale data sharing improves 
retailer support from its suppliers, which ultimately provides the customer with the right 
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product at the right time. They conclude by discussing relationships within the supply 
chain for the suppliers and retailers and how any gaps between policies and risk attitudes 
between the two can be narrowed. 
Powell (2002), writing in a Conference Board report, relays information on the 
transformation of the supply chain within the business model due to technology 
improvements (enterprise resource planning software, the Internet, etc.), global reach of 
companies, and senior executive influence. This reorganization and transformation has 
led to new measures of effectiveness and performance. Powell proposes the most 
effective metrics according to senior business executives whose jobs depend on 
effectively and efficiently managing their supply chains. These metrics include “total 
year-over-year savings; lower inventory levels expressed in dollars; reduced logistics and 
delivery costs; increased speed in supply chain operations; reduced lead times” among 
others. They can be used to determine if a supply chain is performing at optimum levels 
and where to potential make changes to improve the overall process. 
Abuhilal, Rabadi, and Sousa-Poza (2006) perform a comparative study on Just-In-
Time (pull) distribution systems with Material Requirements Planning (push) systems. 
After identifying numerous parameters (such as cost of facilities, inventory, 
transportation, and information) that can be used to determine the best system for one’s 
supply chain, they present a methodology for comparison and selection. The most 
important elements for determining the best methodology are “inventory costs, demand 
patterns, and the average demand level.”  If the desire is to have the lowest inventory 
costs, then a pull system should be selected; whereas if all available information provides 
only average demand levels and patterns, then a push system would be better suited for 
the total process. 
Trebilcock (2009) discusses how Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is working 
with Accenture, a non-defense company, to overhaul its supply chain management 
processes and systems to become more demand driven. Rather than relying on historical 




planning and management tools to provide items according to demand. Trebilcock shows 
how this demand-driven supply chain can work with regards to planning aircraft 
maintenance parts. 
Lavallee (2009) suggested in an article that appeared in The Globe and Mail 
(Canada) that in order for the U.S. auto industry to survive, they needed to revamp their 
“centrally-planned push system that breeds complexity and inefficiency.”  He specifically 
discussed General Motors and its need to convert their push-production and supply chain 
model into a consumer-driven demand pull production model, which in the end would 
allow them to compete effectively because their product lines and production systems 
would be dramatically simpler, their business models would be lower-cost, and their 
supply chains would be tightly integrated from suppliers all the way to the dealers. While 
many companies did shift to a pull-type system, some of these same companies had 
shifted back to push-based systems because of changes in philosophies in senior 
management.  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a progress report in 2009 
that the DoD needed to produce significant improvements to the inventory management 
and distribution aspects of supply chain from a “high” to a lower risk level. The overall 
GAO recommendation is to improve the provision from suppliers to the war-fighter and 
to improve readiness of equipment while reducing and/or avoiding costs. DoD plan on 
achieving this by concentrating on three major focus areas: Asset Visibility, Forecasting, 
and Distribution. By applying metrics and baselines to the focus areas, the DoD set about 
to start ten major initiatives listed below: 
 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
 Item Unique Identification (IUID) 
 Joint Regional Inventory Material Management (JRIMM) 
 Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) 
 War Reserve Material Improvements 
 Commodity Management 
 Joint Theater Logistics (JTL) 
 Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) 
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 Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative (DTCI) 
 Business Enterprise Priorities 
A majority of the initiatives listed above do not specifically call out utilizing a push or 
pull system of distribution, but the long-term goal of this study was to ensure that 
“responsive, consistent, and reliable support” could be provided to the war-fighter during 
peacetime and war, which involves utilizing either a push, pull or hybrid mixture of a 
distribution system.  
The DoD replied to a GAO report in 2007 acknowledging having major issues 
within its Supply Chain Management practices. There have been several audit 
organizations that provided over 400 recommendations that focused specifically on 
improving certain aspects of the DoD’s Supply Chain Management, which included 
management oversight, performance tracking, planning, policy, and processes. At the 
time of the response, the DoD had implemented 275 of the recommendations. The GAO 
acknowledged that the DoD had made a strong commitment to improving Supply Chain 
Management, but stated that the DoD’s plan lacked outcome-focused performance 
metrics and cost metrics that would enable tracking the efforts in order to demonstrate 
improvements in Asset Visibility, Forecasting and Distribution. 
A number of websites were useful in our discussion of Naval Munitions 
Commands. Specifically, we used www.ToyotaGlobal.com, www.GlobalSecurity.org, 
www.MilitaryNewComers.com, www.Navy.Memorieshop.com, and 
www.CNIC.Navy.mil. Each of these websites provided valuable information that was 
difficult to locate otherwise due to the relatively new status of Naval Munitions 
Commands (previously called Naval Magazines and Naval Weapons Stations). 
 
 16 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 17 
III. NAVAL MUNITIONS COMMANDS BACKGROUND 
A. OVERVIEW 
In this section, we outline each of the eight major Naval Munitions Centers 
(NMC) (displayed in Figure 4). Located on both east and west coasts, as well as at 
overseas locations, these NMCs directly support a direct customer base. We include their 
locations and who their main end-user customers are as part of this discussion. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Major Naval Munitions Command 
B. NAVAL MUNITIONS COMMAND (NMC) - EARLE 
NMC Earle is located along the northern shore of New Jersey and is currently the 
homeport to 4 support ships (USS SEATTLE, USS DETROIT, USS SUPPLY, USS 
ARCTIC) and the Combat Logistics Group 2. Named after Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, 
who was the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance during World War I, NMC Earle was 
opened in 1943. The most distinguishing characteristic of this munitions center is “Wye” 
shaped pier (see Figure 5) that stretches over two miles into the Sandy Hook bay 
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(GlobalSecurity.org website, 2011). This pier was designed so that multiple deep draft 
vessels could pull into the bay and conduct weapons onloads at a safe distance from land 
(and the civilian population).   
Additionally, there is the “Mainland” portion of the base which is used to house 
ammunition that is provided to the fleet. NMC Earle has “an integrated work force of 
military and civilian personnel [that] operate the inland storage, renovation, 
transshipment and demilitarization facilities” (GlobalSecurity.org website, 2011). Today, 
NMC Earle’s main customers are those supply ships that onload weapons and then sail to 
meet combatant ships for munitions transfers conducted at sea. 
 
 
Figure 5.   “Wye” Pier at NMC–Earle (From GlobalSecurity.org website, 2011) 
C. NAVAL MUNITIONS COMMAND - YORKTOWN 
NMC Yorktown is located in Yorktown, Virginia, and is the home of the Navy 
Munitions Command. This command “is designed to align all ashore ordnance support 
operations in the United States and Asia into one worldwide unit and consolidate 2.100 
personnel under three divisions: CONUS East Division, CONUS West Division and East 




Virginia, NMC Yorktown is the home of 25 tenant commands and directly supports the 
fleet as supply, amphibious and combatant ships can been seen arriving and departing 
either of the base’s two piers. 
D. NAVAL MUNITIONS COMMAND - CHARLESTON 
NMC Charleston is located in Charleston, South Carolina, and is the home to the 
Naval Nuclear Power Training Command and the Navy Munitions Command CONUS 
East Division Detachment. The Nuclear Power Training Command is where officers and 
enlisted sailors undertake intensive training to operate nuclear propulsion plants on either 
aircraft carriers or submarines. The then-Weapons Station was first appointed in 1690 as 
a “Powder Receiver” and was formally commissioned in 1941 and designed to hold more 
than 60 million pounds of conventional ordnance. 
“NMC CED Detachment Charleston maintains 55 magazines and seven above 
ground storage sites which have a capacity of more than 60 million pounds of explosives. 
It provides ordnance support to the Marine Corps and Army Pre-positioned Afloat 
Programs, provides ordnance to military units in theater and throughout the world, 
supports the ordnance needs of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and 
arranges world-wide ordnance transportation requirements for Naval Weapons Station 
and tenant activities including The Citadel” (MilitaryNewcomers.com website, 2011). 
E. NAVAL MUNITIONS COMMAND – INDIAN ISLAND 
NMC Indian Island is located in Washington State between Port Townsend Bay 
and Kilisut Harbor and is the only deep water ammunition depot on the Pacific coast for 
naval combat ships and Military Sealift Command vessels in the Pacific Fleet and joint 
services. Previously a naval magazine, the United States Navy also uses Indian Island as 
a servicing center for the converted Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile submarines (now 
SSGNs). The ammunition pier at Indian Island is capable of handling multiple ships at 
once and is large enough to service a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. NMC Indian Island has 
a working staff of twelve active duty military and approximately 124 civil service and 
contract employees who handle the receipt, storage, issuance, and inspection of 
ammunition (Navy.Memorieshop.com website, 2011). 
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F. NAVAL MUNITIONS COMMAND – SEAL BEACH 
NMC Seal Beach is located in Seal Beach, CA. Since World War II the base has 
evolved into the Navy’s primary West Coast ordnance storage, loading and maintenance 
installation. Under the station’s primary tenant, the Navy Munitions Command, cruisers, 
destroyers, frigates, and medium-sized amphibious assault ships are loaded with missiles, 
torpedoes, countermeasures devices and conventional ammunition at the facility’s 1,000-
foot-long wharf (more information on these vessels and weapons can be found at the 
Navy Fact File). In addition, larger ships can be accommodated within a protected 
explosives anchorage located in nearby Long Beach Harbor. Personnel also perform 
maintenance on some weapons systems. An average of 50 vessels either onload or 
offload weapons here each year. The weapons station services a majority of the U.S. 
Pacific Fleet. 
NMC Seal Beach also has two detachments located in Fallbrook, CA, and Norco, 
CA, each serving a different purpose. Unique among most naval weapons facilities, 
Detachment Fallbrook is located 9 miles inland. Ammunition is transferred to and from 
ships by a process known as Vertical Replenishment, or VERTREP. In this operation, 
ammunition is taken by truck from a magazine on base to a helicopter pad located inside 
Camp Pendleton. From the helicopter pad, MH-60S Seahawk helicopters lift the load and 
transfer it to the receiving ship waiting several miles off the coast. In this manner, large 
vessels such as amphibious assault ships can be loaded without leaving their primary 
Southern California operating and training areas. 
Detachment Fallbrook is also home to the only West Coast Air-Launched Missile 
Production and Storage Facility. Here air-launched missiles are inspected, maintained and 
re-certified. Overall, the installation stores munitions with a monetary value of 
approximately half a billion dollars. Detachment Norco is a weapons research facility 
where they conduct and assess current and future weapons (CNIC.Navy.mil website, 
2011). 
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G. NAVAL MUNITIONS COMMAND – PEARL HARBOR 
NMC Lualualei is located in the State of Hawaii on the island of Oahu. The 
magazine complex at the Lualualei Headquarters Branch occupies approximately 7,498 
acres of land in the Lualualei Valley on the Leeward (western) coast of Oahu. The 
mission of Naval Munitions Command, Lualualei is to receive, renovate, maintain, store, 
and issue ammunition, explosives, expendable ordnance items and weapons, and 
technical ordnance material for the Navy, Air Force, and Army and other activities and 
units as designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Fifty W-800––munitions 
for Tomahawk Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) and 40 nuclear aerial 
bombs are stored in the Lualualei Naval Magazine (NAVMAG) at West Loch on Oahu, 
Hawaii (GlobalSecurity.org website, 2011).  
H. NAVAL MUNITIONS COMMAND – GUAM 
NMC – East Asia Division (EAD) Guam is located in Hagatna, Guam and is the 
Navy’s largest and most capable overseas mine shop. The primary mission is to store, 
maintain, assemble, and deliver underwater mines in response to tasking from Unified 
Theater Commanders. NMC EAD Guam directly supports Commander SEVENTH 
FLEET aircraft and submarines; however, the primary mine delivery platforms that they 
support are United States Air Force strategic bombers, which fly missions out of 
Andersen Air Force Base, also located on the island of Guam (CNIC.Navy.mil website, 
2011). 
I. NAVAL MUNITIONS COMMAND – SASEBO (JAPAN) 
NMC EAD Detachment Sasebo is located in Sasebo, Japan, and maintains the 
largest ordnance facility in the Western Pacific Ocean area. The primary mission is to 
provide ammunition and other ordnance material to the war fighter. The two facilities at 
Maebata and Harioshima play a vital role in arming our forward-deployed Navy, Marine 
Corps, Army and Air Force units, who protect the 7th Fleet area of concentration. 
Currently, there are close to 40,000 tons of Navy and Marine Corps Ammunition housed 
at the detachment facilities in Sasebo (CNIC.Navy.mil website, 2011). 
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IV. ORDNANCE SUPPLY CHAIN AND INDUSTRY BEST 
PRACTICES 
A. ORDNANCE SUPPLY CHAIN 
1. Current Process Review 
In this section, we discuss the current ordnance distribution phase of the supply 
chain that is employed in the United States Navy. For this discussion, we split the 
distribution of munitions into two categories: the first being the Load Plan Requisition 
Distribution Model and the second being the End User Distribution Model.  
a. Load Plan Requisition Distribution Model 
This portion of the distribution supply chain begins with the Strategic 
Storage facilities. These deep storage facilities house munitions which are received 
directly from contractor sites or maintenance facilities to be distributed to various Naval 
intermediate storage points prior to shipment to the end user. For the Navy, the Naval 
Munitions Commands play the role of the intermediate storage facility. The inventories 
located at the NMCs are managed by the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) 
Logistic Management Specialists (LMS), who oversee the inventory of the non-nuclear 
ammunition supply chain. 
The Load Plan Requisition Distribution Model is designed for the resupply 
of Naval Munitions Commands for the support of the Global Requirements Based Load 
Plan (GBRLP). The Load Plan for a NMC is defined as the required munitions that must 
be maintained on hand to ensure that its stated customers (end users such as ships, aircraft 
squadrons, SEAL Teams, SEABEE Battalions, Coast Guard units and United States 
Marine Corps aviation units) can place a requisition and have their on-hand allowances at 
100%. Essentially, the Load Plan stocking thresholds are calculated based on the 
cumulative total of weapons required by the end users supported by that particular NMC.   
These NMCs are supplied based on gaps in the Load Plan requirements. For example, if 
one NMC is tasked with supporting the weapons allowance for 10 Destroyers, that NMC 
must hold any munitions that are required to get those individual destroyers up to their 
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100% on-hand allowance. So, if a destroyer has an allowance of 100 5-inch rounds and 
only has 75 currently on-hand, the NMC must have the remaining 25 on-hand and ready 
for shipment to that destroyer. 
If the NMC falls ever below 90% of what is required to be on-hand to 
satisfy the Load Plan, that NMC is deemed non-compliant (R. M. Conquest, personal 
communication, March 7, 2012). There are two methods of remedy if this situation 
occurs. The first is for the NMC to send a requisition to the strategic storage facility to 
replenish any munitions that may have been shipped to an end user to bring the inventory 
level back to compliance. This system is a “pull” system because the customer, in this 
case the NMC with a shortage, is pulling more material from upstream. The second 
method of resupply is done by a LMS in which he reviews the on-hand inventories at 
numerous NMC locations and directs the transfer from one NMC to another. This cross-
shipment between NMCs is a “push” system because one facility is being directed to send 
goods to another location. Thus, the NMC’s are either pushed ammunition based on what 
the LMS sees in the virtual inventory, or the NMC’s will pull munitions based on future 
events that they know, but the LMS’s may not, such as particular training exercises prior 
to a unit’s deployment. This total system of re-supply to the NMCs is depicted in Figure 
6, where the solid lines are the munitions shipments from the deep storage facility to the 
NMC and the dashed lines are the cross-shipments between the NMCs. 
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Figure 6.   Load Plan Distribution Network 
b. End User Distribution Model 
The End User Distribution Model is solely dependent upon a requisition 
from an end user signaling to the ordnance supply system that re-supply is required. End 
users send requisitions into the Ordnance Information System (OIS) for resupply of their 
expended rounds. The majority of these requisitions are filled directly from their 
supporting NMC per the discussion above. AMMOPAC/AMMOLANT host pre-
deployment meetings with the end users and conduct a “spot check” to determine what 
ammunition they need to order and tell the end user exactly what to order. Munitions are 
never pushed from the NMC to the end user. 
When an end user’s requisitions are submitted into the OIS, they are 
processed in one of two ways. The business rules within the OIS application then route 
the requisition to the appropriate person—either a LMS or a waterfront representative at 
AMMOLANT or AMMOPAC for action. These rules are primarily based on the 
geographic location of the customer. If the customer is located east of the Mississippi 
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River, then the requisition is forwarded to AMMOLANT. Conversely, the requisition is 
forwarded to AMMOPAC if the customer is home-ported west of the Mississippi River. 
If an item is deemed to be in short supply, the requisition is routed directly to a LMS for 
action. Additionally (and beyond the scope of our thesis project), “mini-AMMOs” exist 
in Combined Task Force 63 and 73 that allow those sites to work requisitions from 
customers that are currently deployed to the Mediterranean or Asian operating areas, 
respectively. 
If the requisition is routed to a LMS for action, that LMS ensures that the 
requisition was entered into the supply system correctly and it is forwarded to that end 
user’s supporting NMC for fill. The main difference between these two sourcing 
methodologies is that a waterfront representative on either coast can direct an NMC to 
support a unit that is not assigned to that NMC’s Load Plan. This is one of the potential 
reasons why one NMC may be short of its required Load Plan and may require “push” 
support as directed from the LMSs. This process is depicted in Figure 7, where the end 
user submits a requisition for material needed (a pull signal to the distribution system). 
This requisition then hits a decision point where either NAVSUP-GLS or waterfront 
representative may process the requisition and direct a NMC to support that requirement 
from the end user. 
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Figure 7.   End User Distribution Model 
2. Current Process Discrepancies and Problems 
While the above describes the process in terms of how it should operate, there 
exists the potential for problems to occur which change how the system actually works. 
The first of these potential issues has already been listed—that of the lack of a standard 
operating procedure when determining how a requisition will be processed. Currently, the 
waterfront representatives serve in more of a reactive role, meaning that a customer asks 
for aid in processing a requisition for munitions before that representative gets involved. 
Additionally, the LMS has a “virtual inventory” in OIS which shows the on-hand balance 
for every warehouse and end user, but that information is only as good as the last update 
to the database, normally a 99.5% accuracy rate (C. A. Murphy, personal communication, 
March 8, 2012). If munitions are transferred from an NMC to an end user at the direction 
of a waterfront representative, the LMS does not have visibility of that filled requisition 
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until a database update occurs. This is the typical situation for how one particular NMC 
may fall below the 90% requirement and be deemed non-compliant with its individual 
Load Plan. 
Another problem with this process is related to the number of requisitions that 
“error out” of the supply system. When errors occur, business processes within OIS route 
the requisition to the appropriate action addressee. One area of concern is that error 
processing is not standardized across the ammunition supply system. Depending on the 
type of error, the requisition may not be corrected by a LMS or waterfront representative 
on either coast. For example, if an end user inputs an incorrect National Stock Number 
(NSN), the requisition is voided and the requisitioner receives a “rejection” status. In 
another example, if a ship orders material in excess of its allowance, the requisition is 
verified with the Type Commander and one of two possibilities exists. First, if the 
allowance in OIS is correct, the requisition is rejected. Second, if the allowance needs to 
be tailored due to a specific mission assignment, the allowance changes and the 
requisition is processed for shipment. In a final example, if the unit of issue within a 
requisition is incorrect, a LMS manually corrects the individual requisition and then it is 
processed by the OIS system. 
Approximately 54.7% of all 251,068 requisitions placed in the last seven years by 
end users have had errors that caused the requisition to be cancelled or required an LMS 
to correct the requisition prior to releasing that order to an NMC for fill. As depicted in 
Figure 8, these errors made by customers have begun to trend down starting in 2010, but 
there are still a considerable number of errors that require many man-hours to correct. It 
is estimated that each requisition requires an average of fifteen minutes to correct (J. M. 
Bolig, personal communication, March 8, 2012). Based on this estimate, 33,000 man-
hours (or 17 years of labor) have been required to correct these 137,000 requisitions. 
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Figure 8.   End User Requisition Data 
Due to the sheer number of incoming requests for parts and munitions to the 
supply system, there are not individualized notifications sent for each of these incorrect 
orders. Instead, it is up to the end user to check their incoming requisition status files to 
determine if there were any problems. End users can receive help when placing 
requisitions from both the waterfront representatives and LMSs to ensure validity when 
initiating an order, but with the number of end users placing orders, both the 
representatives and LMSs would quickly be overwhelmed if each customer asked for 
help. 
B. INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICES 
In this section, we cover how the push, pull and hybrid distribution systems have 
been used effectively in the civilian sector. Three successful corporations which have 
incorporated either push distribution, pull distribution or a hybrid version of both are 
Barilla, Toyota and Wal-Mart, respectively. Each has found their own niche through 
mastering their distribution processes.  
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1. Push Distribution 
The first corporation that will be reviewed is Barilla, Inc, which is the world’s 
largest pasta producer (Simchi-Levi et al., 2008). During the late 1980s, Barilla suffered 
increased operational inefficiencies and cost penalties that were the result of large week-
to-week variations in its distributors’ order patterns. Barilla was unable to accurately 
forecast this demand for many reasons, such as long lead times, no minimum or 
maximum order quantities, promotional activities, volume discounts and transportation 
discounts. Some distributors offered customers discounts and free transportation if they 
ordered full truckloads of pasta, and sales representatives earned larger salaries and 
commissions based on the amount of pasta they sold. Thus, Barilla began looking for a 
way to curb these variations in weekly orders from the distributors. 
Brando Vitali, who was the Director of Logistics at Barilla, recommended that 
they utilize “Just in Time Distribution (JITD),” which was modeled after the popular 
“Just in Time (JIT)” manufacturing concept. By using this process, he estimated that he 
could reduce the amount of variation in customer orders.   He proposed that, “rather than 
follow the traditional practice of delivering product to Barilla’s distributors on the basis 
of whatever orders those distributors placed with the company, Barilla’s own logistics 
organization would instead specify the ‘appropriate’ delivery quantities—those that 
would more effectively meet the end consumer’s needs yet also distribute the workload 
on Barilla’s manufacturing and logistics systems more evenly” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2008). 
In order to do this, Barilla had to have the full support of the distributors because the 
distributors would be giving up control on how much of an item they order and the times 
on when they place those orders. In essence, the distributor would have no control over 
what stock they would receive and would be totally dependent upon the manufacturer to 
send them the right stock at the right time.    
In order for JITD, or “Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI)” to work for Barilla, 
they had to have visibility over the pasta that was being ordered from the distributors and 
being delivered to the supermarkets where it was being sold. By having this data, Barilla 
would be able to send the distributors only what they needed, no more or no less, which 
would ultimately reduce distribution costs, inventory levels and manufacturing costs. 
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This system was designed so that each distributor would provide daily information to 
Barilla regarding what products were shipped out to the retailers and the status of their 
current inventory level for each product. With this data, Barilla could then compare all 
the data and make shipment decisions based on updated forecasts.   
With so many changes in their business processes, there was considerable push-
back from Barilla’s sales associates and distributors. Some were worried about Barilla 
not being able to effectively manage the inventory levels at the warehouses, thus leading 
to “increased risk of having the supermarkets stock out of product,” and opening the door 
for competitors to seize the demand of customers (Simchi-Levi et al., 2008). A manager 
at one of the distribution centers told Barilla, “managing stock is my job; I don’t need 
you to see my warehouse or my figures. I could improve my inventory and service levels 
if you would deliver my orders more quickly” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2008). They did not 
have faith that Barilla could manage the inventory, and because of that, they did not want 
to share the shipment data. 
Barilla decided that the only way they could get the buy-in would be to run an 
experiment at one of the distributor sites. Within the first month of implementing JITD, 
inventory levels at the warehouses dropped from 10.1 days to 3.6 days, and service levels 
to retail stores increased from 98.9% to 99.8%. Distributors were not comfortable with 
having only 3 days of inventory on hand, so Barilla agreed to increase the number to 5 
days. Over a six month period, Barilla analyzed daily shipment data of the distribution 
center and created a new and improved forecast based on this data. The stock out rate 
prior to the experiment was between 2% and 5%, and after implementation it dropped 
down to less than .25%. Deeming the experiment a success, Barilla began implementing 
the Just in Time Distribution method at all their distributors. The benefits of this method 
for the distributor were improved fill rates to the supermarkets and reduced inventory 
holding costs. Barilla also benefited by having reduced manufacturing costs, better 
relationships with their distributors, improved forecasting method using daily data, and 
an overall reduction in inventory levels (Simchi-Levi et al., 2008). 
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2. Pull Distribution 
Next, we look at Toyota, which is the leading Japanese automobile producer 
whom is known for producing quality personal vehicles. They created the “Toyota 
Production System (TPS),” which is founded on the philosophy of “the complete 
elimination of all waste imbuing all aspects of production in pursuit of the most efficient 
methods” (ToyotaGlobal.com website, 2012). Toyota uses a version of the “Pull” 
methodology called “Just-In-Time (JIT),” where they only make vehicles when they are 
actually ordered by customers instead of manufacturing many vehicles based on a 
forecast. Again, this is based on the concept that “each process produces only what is 
needed by the next process in a continuous flow” (ToyotaGlobal.com website, 2012). 
With this system and process shown in Figure 9, Toyota can efficiently, effectively and 
quickly produce vehicles of high quality and per customer specifications that will fully 
meet the customer’s needs. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Example of Automobile Push Production System Diagram  
(From Russell & Taylor, 2005) 
Toyota has mastered this method by adhering to the sound principle of only 
producing what is needed when it is needed and in the right amount. The first step in the 
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process occurs when an order is placed for a vehicle; that order must be sent to the 
production line as quickly as possible to prevent unnecessary delays. The second step is 
to ensure that the assembly line is stocked and equipped with all necessary parts and 
equipment to manufacture that vehicle. The third step is to ensure that all parts that were 
used for producing that vehicle are immediately replaced on the assembly line by parts 
from their stock. The final step is to ensure that the parts that were pulled from stock are 
replenished by their supplier. By achieving these steps and only producing a vehicle 
when it is ordered, they avoid overproduction. TPS is very effective for Toyota because 
they base their production on customer demand, not forecasts or historical data. By doing 
this, “they minimize their work in process and warehousing of inventory by stocking 
small amounts of each product and frequently restocking based on what the customer 
actually takes away” (Liker, 2004). 
Another reason why Toyota has been so successful with the “Pull” or “Just-In-
Time” strategy is because they have a culture of constantly looking for ways to improve 
themselves. They are interested in lean manufacturing, and the workers are actively 
providing improvement suggestions on how the process can be improved. Toyota 
encourages their employees to make suggestions for improvements and depends on them 
because they are the ones actively involved in the day-to-day operations. Toyota’s 
philosophy is that they would rather stop or slow down production in order to get the 
quality right the first time with hopes of enhancing productivity in the long run. 
One of the drawbacks of using JIT is that any potential disruption in the supply 
chain could hinder Toyota from getting the parts they need in a timely manner and thus 
affect their manufacturing capabilities. Toyota recently experienced this rare disruption in 
March 2011 when a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred off the coast of Japan. This 
earthquake caused a huge tsunami that wreaked havoc on the northern Japanese coastline 
and disrupted the production and delivery of parts between Toyota and its suppliers. With 
Toyota operating on a Just in Time system, they did not have large inventory levels on 
hand to keep up with customer demand, so they were unable to produce the required 
number of vehicles and thus lost business to its competitors. 
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3. Hybrid Distribution 
Lastly, we look at Wal-Mart, who is one of the top discount retailers in the world. 
They employ a hybrid version of the “push-pull” distribution system, which they break 
down into two processes. The first process is the customer purchase cycle, which is when 
a product is sold at a local Wal-Mart store. This sale is captured within their point-of-sale 
system and it triggers their virtual inventory that there is an empty spot on the shelf that 
needs to be replenished. This demand for a product is then relayed to the distribution 
center, and the distribution center sends this product to the store to fulfill their 
requirement (to restock the shelf). This is the “pull” part of the process because the Wal-
Mart store is pulling products from upstream based solely on customer demand. 
The second process is the “push” portion, which occurs in the replenishment, 
distribution, manufacturing and procurement cycles. All data that was collected in the 
first step is also received by the manufacturers and distributors. This data is then merged 
with past historical data and their forecasts for products are created. The manufacturers 




Figure 10.   Depiction of Push/Pull Boundary used by Wal-Mart 
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4. Conclusions of Best Practices 
In closing, it is clear that the three companies highlighted above have found the 
distribution system that works best for them. Each organization must take a look at what 
they are trying to accomplish with their distribution system and then tailor their needs to 
meet their desired goals. In the beginning of Barilla, they used a pull system, but they 
were experiencing numerous problems so they made the switch to a push system and 
have had success since. While the pull system works for Toyota, it does not work for 
General Motors, and therefore they utilize the push system for their manufacturing of 
vehicles. Wal-Mart has found a way to take the best of both systems and make it their 
own, and have thus achieved superior results allowing them to be the top retailer in the 
world. Each distribution system has positives and negatives and a company must decide 
what type of system they need to succeed and remain competitive in their marketplace 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. DATA RETRIEVAL 
The data for our thesis project was provided by Naval Supply Systems 
Command–Global Logistics Support. This data included seven fiscal years of the total 
number of requisitions placed by end users, orders placed by Naval Munitions 
Commands for replenishment of on-hand stock, and requisitions entered into the system 
by Logistics Management Specialists (LMS) to push ammunition to an NMC (if the 
NMC was below its required allowance and had not placed a replenishment order). From 
2005 through 2011, there were a total of 251,068 customer-based requisitions. Of those 
requisitions, 4.99% (12,525) were expedited as the customer’s behest based on a 
Required Delivery Date code 999. Code 999 indicates that the customer requires this 
material as soon as possible, so it must be expedited vice being sent via normal means of 
shipment.   
While the actual dollar values for independent shipments of munitions were not 
available, expedited shipments had shipping charges between $400 and $1,400 more than 
routine shipments, and the total dollar amount spent annually for the past seven years on 
all shipments was around thirty million dollars (C. A. Murphy, personal communication, 
March 8, 2012). The average Navy expenditure for expedited shipments was nearly nine 
million dollars a year, meaning that while these expedited shipments were a relatively 
low percentage of the total orders, they did account for approximately 30% of the total 
shipping costs for all ammunition (C. A. Murphy, personal communication, March 8, 
2012). Thus, the potential for dramatic cost savings exists if the overall system can be 
modified to reduce the number of shipments that must be expedited. 
Additionally, the data from NAVSUP included the number of requisitions that 
had some error within the order. Some of these errors required that the requisition be 




by an LMS. Computations show that 63.39% of the expedited requisitions contained 




Table 1.   Requisition Error Data 
 
B. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Prior to creating the model for conducting data analysis, it was decided that a 
Monte Carlo simulation would be used for working with this data. This determination 
was made because of the limited nature of the data that was available and the variability 
and randomness in customer order patterns, such as the total number of orders for the past 
seven years, the number that was required to be expedited, and those orders that had 
errors. Additionally, a group of assumptions and random variables was developed that 
needed to be tested, and running a Monte Carlo simulation provided the best possible set 
up and analysis of these variables. 
The initial objective of this simulation was to use the data provided and recreate 
expedited and total shipping costs per NAVSUP-GLS information. In order to achieve 
approximate values of $30M in total shipping costs and $9M in expedited shipping costs, 
assumptions had to be made about the data, which are covered below. Once the model 
simulation was created, it was then used to test potential scenarios if the ordering system 
were changed from a pull-based system to a push-based system. Specifically, the 
scenarios involved reductions in shipping costs and labor hours required to correct 
requisitions. 
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1. Relevant Assumptions and Variables 
The first assumption made in this project was to assume that expedited costs are 
higher than non-expedited costs. Based on this, some level of savings should be achieved 
if the total number of expedited shipments decreased. This assumption seemed to be 
intuitive since rushed shipments are almost always more expensive in cost when 
compared to “normal” modes of shipment, but without this assumption being made, there 
would be no reason to change the current process. In order to validate the simulation 
based on the total shipping costs identified by NAVSUP-GLS, $700 was multiplied by 
the number of routine shipments (95% of all requisitions are routine in nature based on 
historical data). There were approximately 34,000 routine requisitions, meaning that 
$23.8M was spent on average for routine shipping. The other 1,800 requisitions (5% of 
the total number of requisitions) are expedited and were multiplied by a random uniform 
dollar value between $4,500 and $5,500. The average cost of expedited shipments was 
$8.9M per year. 
The second assumption made was that requisition rework could be reduced by 
changing the current ordering process. While it is extremely unlikely that any change 
would be 100% effective, any elimination of rework would result in costs savings in 
terms of labor expenditure. As stated earlier, the current ordnance supply chain is a pull-
based system where requisitions are generated by end users that need to be resupplied 
based on expended ordnance. The current system requires an LMS to correct any 
requisition that has an error. NAVSUP personnel currently spend between ten and twenty 
minutes on each requisition that contains an error (J. M. Bolig, personal communication, 
March 8, 2012). By changing  to a push-based system,  where the LMS inputs the 
requisition directly into the system for the customer, a reduction in labor hours spent 
correcting requisitions would be attained because the OIS interface LMSs use does not 
allow any errors into the system. Corrections would be made immediately and the 
requisition would be processed instantaneously. Accordingly, this range of time that it 
takes to correct a single requisition was incorporated into the simulation using historical 
error rated for expedited and routine requisitions. The sum totals for each type of error is 
then added and converted into hours for labor analysis. 
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2. Model Creation and Initial Output 
The first step in creating the model was to determine the expected number of 
annual ordnance requisitions and how many of those would be expedited or sent via 
routine transport. Using the data provided from NAVSUP, analysis of the last seven years 
of data determined that the average number of orders per month over the seven years was 
2,985 orders/month with a standard deviation of 531 orders/month. In an effort to 
increase to attain a clearer picture of most likely outcomes within the model simulation, 
these annual numbers were run 10,000 times and then converted into monthly figures. To 
generate a random number of monthly requisitions in the simulation, a normal 
distribution with a mean of 2,985 and the standard deviation of 531 was used. The 
percentages of previous orders (4.99% expedited and 95.01% routine) were multiplied by 
the results of this monthly figure, which provided the starting point for analysis with the 
assumption that a similar number of munitions orders would be placed on a monthly basis 
in the future. 
At this point, the simulation was divided in order to run two variables. The first 
variable that was tested related to the cost structure of shipments. To validate the model 
based on current shipping charges, routine shipments were assumed to have a constant 
cost of $700 per shipment and expedited shipments had a random cost between $4,500 
and $5,500 per shipment. This initial simulation generated a total shipping cost averaging 
more than $32M and expedited shipment cost averaging $8.9M. 
The second simulation tested the labor hours expended on making corrections to 
requisitions containing errors. Again, using the randomly generated monthly requisition 
totals for routine and expedited requests, the model determined the total expected number 
of requisitions that would contain errors based on the historical data from the past seven 
years by multiplying by an error rate of 63.39% for expedited shipment requests and 
54.29% for routine orders. These numbers were then multiplied by a randomly generated 
number between ten and twenty minutes, which is the average amount of time that is 
required to correct a requisition (J. M. Bolig, personal communication, March 8, 2012). 
When computed into hours, there was an average of 4,901 hours annually expended on 
these corrections with a standard deviation of 376 hours. 
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C. MODEL OUTPUT AND ANALYSIS 
1. Initial Model Output 
After running the model with 10,000 trials using routine shipping costs of $700 
and a random distribution between $4,500 and $5,500 per expedited shipment, the mean 
value for total shipping costs was $32.8M as seen in Figure 11. Mean expedited 
shipments, depicted in Figure 12, accounted for $8.9M. Based on these two data pulls, 
expedited shipments accounted for 27% of the total shipping costs. 
 
 




Figure 12.   Current System Annual Expedited Shipping Cost 
When determining the initial number of labor hours needed to correct requisitions 
containing errors, the model used the randomly generated monthly requisition totals for 
routine and expedited requests multiplied by the previously stated error rates. As seen in 
Figure 13, an average of 4,901 hours is annually expended on these corrections.   When 
viewed through the framework that the average employee works 160 hours per month, 
this means that 30.6 months (or just over two and a half years) of labor is required for 
these corrections each year. In other words, two and a half full-time workers must be 
employed to fix these errors each year of the current system’s operation. 
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Figure 13.   Current Annual Labor Hours Expended on Corrections to Requisitions 
These results are based on the initial run of the model that was developed and also 
include all possible outcomes from the data distributions. This was the starting point for 
our data analysis. We then developed a worst case scenario for changes as well as middle 
and best case scenarios. Finally, we created a scenario that was most likely based on 
guidance received from NAVSUP personnel. 
2. Worst-Case Scenario 
In the worst-case scenario, errors in customer orders were dropped by 20% for 
each type of orders. Specifically, estimated errors in expedited orders decreased from 
63.39% to 43.39% and routine orders from 54.26% to 34.26%. Additionally, an 
assumption was made that there would be no reduction in the total number of shipments 
that had to be expedited. Since no change in total number of shipments occurred in this 
simulation run, the average total annual shipping costs and expedited shipping costs 
remained the same. However, the average of total labor hours spent making corrections 
dropped to 3,111 hours. This amounted to a reduction of 1,790 hours, or nearly one full 
labor-year of work performed by a LMS. While these may seem like modest savings, this 
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reduction would amount to more than $85,000 if a Petty Officer First Class was 
employed to correct errors in requisitions. For continuity, it was assumed that a Petty 
Officer First Class made all corrections so that the same annual DoD composite rate of 
compensation could be employed throughout the analysis. 
3. Middle-Case Scenario 
For the middle-case scenario, two changes were made within the model. First, the 
total number of requisitions with errors was reduced to 5% total for both expedited and 
routine orders. Second, the total number of orders that had to be expedited was reduced 
from 4.99% to 3.00%. These assumptions were made based on the belief that having a 
LMS enter the requisitions would significantly reduce error generation and, through use 
of a virtual inventory, a LMS would place the orders early enough that there would be a 
reduction in the total number of requisitions requiring expediting. 
The results of this simulation showed significant reductions in both shipping costs 
and labor hours spent correcting errors. The mean total number of labor hours was 
reduced to 447 hours as shown in Figure 14. With this amount of savings, the Navy could 
reduce overtime work to less than 3 months (447 hours / 160 hours/month = 2.79 months) 
instead of the current 2.55 years (4,901 hours / 160 hours/month / 12 months/year) and 
have a savings of more than $216,000.00. Separately, this could lead to lower utilization 




Figure 14.   Error Reduction to 5% Total for both Expedited and Routine Orders 
Average total shipping costs were reduced from $32.8M to $29.6M, as seen in 
Figure 15, which included expedited shipping costs reductions of approximately $3.6M 
(Figure 16). Overall, with these assumptions, a total average savings in shipping of 
$3.2M is generated. 
 
Figure 15.   Total Shipping Costs when Expedited Orders Equal 3% of Total Orders 
 46 
 
Figure 16.   Expedited Orders Equal 3% of Total Orders 
4. Best-Case Scenario 
In the best-case, errors in both expedited and routine orders were reduced to 1% 
and only 1% of all orders required expedited shipment. These are drastic numbers, 
especially for the number of expedited shipments, but they showed that changing the 
current ordnance distribution system from a customer driven pull system to a virtual 
inventory push system would have significant cost savings for the Navy. The total 
average number of labor hours was reduced to 90 hours (Figure 17). This reduction 
amounts to an average man-hours savings of 4,811 hours and more than $233,000.00, and 
with errors occurring this infrequently, the amount of rework is cut to less than one 




Figure 17.   Errors Reduced to 1% in both Expedited and Routine Orders 
Total shipping costs were reduced from an average of $32.8M to $26.6, as seen in 
Figure 18. In addition, mean expedited shipping costs were cut down from $8.9M to 
$1.8M (Figure 19). An estimated total savings in the best case scenario would be $6.2M. 
When labor cost savings are included, total savings for this model simulation amount to 
more than $6.4M. 
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Figure 18.   Total Shipping Costs when Expedited Orders Equal 1% 
 
 
Figure 19.   Expedited Orders Equal 1% of Total Orders 
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5. Most Likely Scenario 
Based on inputs received from NAVSUP, we determined that the most likely 
scenario if the ordnance requisitioning system is changed from a pull to a push system 
would be for the total number of errors to be reduced to 1% and that 3% of all 
requisitions would have to be expedited. The error rate was based upon the fact that if an 
order is entered into the OIS incorrectly, it would immediately show and the error would 
not be processed. The LMS, who is the expert at using the OIS, could then make the 
required corrections on the spot and there would be no time lost in the processing the 
order. Separately, there would always be contingencies that the Navy must be ready and 
thus reducing the likelihood of expedited requirements down to 1% did not seem feasible. 
This most likely scenario combines the findings from the middle and best-case 
simulations already run. Specifically, the number of labor hours spent correcting errors 
would be reduced from 4,901 hours per year to 90 hours per year, which amounts to a 
total cost savings in labor of more than $233,000. Average total shipping costs were 
reduced from $32.8M to a total of $29.6M while expedited shipping costs were reduced 
from $8.9M to $5.3M. Based on these assumptions, the most likely total savings would 
be $3.2M in terms of shipping and $233,000.00 in labor costs for a total of $3.4M per 
year. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION CHANGE 
1. Recommendation for Change 
Based on our findings from simulation, and numerous discussions with personnel 
from the NAVSUP GLS, we recommend that the ammunition distribution system for the 
Navy be changed from a pull-based system to a push-based vendor-managed inventory 
system. As shown in the results from each of the simulation scenarios, shifting 
distribution systems would result in savings in both labor and transportation costs. If the 
simulation is accurate, expedited shipments would show an actual reduction of 
approximately $3.6M and routine shipment costs would increase by approximately 
$500,000. As listed above, an additional $233,000 in labor savings could be realized, 
which brings the total savings to over $3.3M for each year if the ordnance supply chain is 
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modified from a pull system to a push system. The results of the simulations can be seen 
below in Table 2. The value of this simulation is shown in the cost savings that will result 
from a shift in distribution policy. While three million dollars is relatively small in terms 
of savings within the scope of the DoD budget, implementation of a similar policy 
throughout each of the services has the potential to result in magnified savings within 
DoD. 
 
Labor (Hours) Labor Reduction % Total Shipping Cost Expedited Shipping Cost
Current Values 4901 N/A $32.8M $8.9M
Worst-Case Scenario 3111 37% N/A N/A
Middle-Case Scenario 447 91% $29.6M $5.3M
Best-Case Scenario 90 98% $26.6M $1.8M
Most Likely Case 90 98% $29.6M $5.3M  
Table 2.   Simulation Results Table 
 
2. Potential Conflicts to Change 
While we are recommending a complete change in the requisitioning and thus 
distribution system for ammunition, there are a number of potential conflicts that might 
hamper implementation. One of the most immediate issues is the element of trust that be 
engendered between the end user and the GLS personnel. A ship’s commanding officer is 
unlikely to relinquish the ordering process for ammunition unless it is shown that a shift 
will actually improve the total readiness of the fleet. A test run, similar to one conducted 
by Barilla, Inc., would be required to insure that the change to the system would work 
before a full implementation Navy-wide. 
A second issue has the potential to limit the amount of savings in labor costs. 
While removing the ordering process from a customer who, in general, gets the 
requisition incorrect the majority of the time, this change may require additional LMSs to 
serve the fleet as a whole. While our best case scenario showed that 2.5 labor years could 
be reduced in terms of correcting errors to requisitions, it may take those 2 employees or 
potentially more to actually take over the system and act on behalf of all end users within 
the system. We expect that a slight increase in personnel would be required to achieve the 
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system shift from pull to push-based after the initial start-up, these employees could be 
phased out and labor savings would be realized. 
With proper training and emphasis, these potential issues would be offset. The 
ability to continuously and effectively support a deploying fleet would put any 
commanding officer’s concerns at ease. Labor savings would be realized once the new 
system is fully up and functional and finally, the total potential costs savings to the Navy 
in a time of tightening budgets would help with total fleet and personnel readiness. 
 52 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 53 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
During our research, we identified some areas within our project that should be 
looked at in more depth and potentially be used for future research projects. In particular, 
we assumed that the number of requisitions for ammunition would remain the same even 
though strategic policy has the United States’ military reducing its footprint in areas of 
current operations. Additionally, data points for actual shipping costs were not able to be 
attained. Actual shipping values would increase the realism of the Monte Carlo 
Simulation. Other potential areas of study are listed below: 
 Obtain actual total shipping costs for each requisition within the data 
provided to solidify actual cost savings for switching from pull-based to 
push-based. This project used only averages for expedited shipping costs 
that were provided by NAVSUP GLS. 
 Analyze certain munitions categories, such as precision guided weapons 
and small arms and then look at actual shipping costs for each category. 
Within doing this, there is the potential to reveal that one category spends 
more on shipping than the other, so it could be researched whether or not 
to ship items in bulk vice smaller single requisitions can save on shipping. 
 This study was conducted with data used during war-time, so usage of 
ammunition was high, as opposed to reduced usage during peace-time. 
Analyze the effect of shipping costs by losing economies of scale with 
regards to shipping items in bulk to save money. Also, analysis could be 
conducted on manpower requirements if customer demand decreases.  
 Research potential risk-pooling for Naval Munitions Commands to relieve 
the requirement of maintaining 100% of a ship’s load plan. By risk-
pooling, cost savings might be realized by the reduction of inventory.  
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